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Use cases

Each example shows what you ask, what Claude Code looks up in Awnexa, and what a good answer looks like. The account, names and IDs are made up: they are the sample data that awnexa init --sample creates, so you can try the same questions without AWS. The Skills installed with awnexa skills install cover these tasks, so you can ask in plain words.

Every answer starts from the same check: Claude Code reads awnexa status and the coverage first, so it knows how old the data is and what was not collected.

Terminal window
awnexa status --compact
awnexa coverage --status partial,failed,access_denied,unsupported,unknown --compact

You: Explain this AWS environment and draw an architecture diagram.

Claude Code gets the whole picture in one call, then the details it needs:

Terminal window
awnexa overview --compact
awnexa resources show orders-db --fields Engine,MultiAZ,StorageEncrypted --compact

Claude Code: From Awnexa (scan of 2026-10-06 10:42; RDS in ap-northeast-3 was access denied and two S3 buckets’ encryption settings could not be read): there are three public entry points. The ALB alb-web forwards HTTPS through the target group web-tg to the ECS service web in the subnets orders-app-a and orders-app-c. The HTTP API orders-api invokes three Lambda functions (orders-create, orders-get, checkout). The EC2 instance orders-bastion has a public IP address. Security groups allow the compute on these paths to reach the Aurora cluster orders-db and the RDS instance reporting — a permission, not observed traffic. The role of the three functions is allowed to send to the SQS queue orders-events, and the task role of web to read the bucket orders-assets-111122223333. The environment variables of checkout name orders-events and orders-db, those of orders-create name orders-events, and those of web and orders-worker name the bucket orders-assets-111122223333 (inferred from the configuration). Separately, the function orders-worker reads orders-events, whose failed messages go to orders-events-dlq. (Mermaid diagram follows.)

Not checked: RDS in ap-northeast-3: databases there may exist but were not visible to this scan. Whether the code really uses these permissions and variables is not part of the configuration; the AWS managed policy of the functions’ role was not evaluated.

The aws-architecture Skill also writes design documents from awnexa report, keeping the coverage warnings.

You: What breaks if I delete security group sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f60718?

Terminal window
awnexa impact sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f60718 --depth 3 --compact

Claude Code: From Awnexa: 8 resources use this security group (orders-app) directly: the ECS service web, 2 network interfaces, the Lambda function checkout, the Aurora cluster orders-db and its 2 instances, and the Secrets Manager VPC endpoint orders-secrets-endpoint. The security groups orders-db and reporting-db allow inbound traffic from it and alb-web allows outbound traffic to it, so their rules depend on it too. Through these, the ALB alb-web, the API orders-api and the RDS instance reporting are affected further away.

Limits: only references in the scanned services are visible. An application that connects by IP address, or a resource in a service Awnexa does not support yet, would not appear here.

You: Checkout has been failing since this morning. What is connected to the checkout function, and what changed recently?

Terminal window
awnexa graph checkout --depth 2 --compact
awnexa snapshot list --compact
awnexa snapshot diff --compact

Without scan IDs, snapshot diff compares the latest scan with the one before it. To compare other scans, give two scan IDs from snapshot list.

Claude Code: From Awnexa: between yesterday’s and today’s scans, two resources changed. The Lambda function checkout renamed its environment variables (DB_HOST and DB_NAME became DATABASE_HOST and DATABASE_NAME, and PAYMENT_TIMEOUT_MS was added; the values are masked) and gained a second security group, orders-app. The security group sg-checkout lost its outbound rule to the database subnets (TCP 5432).

My reading (not a fact from the scan): the removed rule alone does not cut checkout off from orders-db: the added orders-app group allows all outbound traffic, and orders-db allows inbound traffic from it. The renamed variables are the more likely cause: if the code still reads DB_HOST, it gets no database address. Check the function’s logs and the deployed code.

Awnexa provides the changes and the connections; finding the cause is Claude Code’s reasoning, and it says so.

You: Which resources are publicly reachable or unencrypted?

Terminal window
awnexa resources list --type AWS::RDS::DBInstance --fields PubliclyAccessible,StorageEncrypted --compact
awnexa resources list --type AWS::EC2::SecurityGroup --fields IpPermissions --limit 100 --compact
awnexa resources list --type AWS::S3::Bucket --fields PublicAccessBlockConfiguration,ServerSideEncryptionConfiguration,UnretrievedConfigurations --compact

Claude Code: From Awnexa: one RDS instance reporting has PubliclyAccessible: true; all three RDS instances in ap-northeast-1 are encrypted. Security group sg-bastion allows TCP 22 from 0.0.0.0/0 — a rule that allows traffic, not proof that anyone connected. alb-web allows TCP 443 from 0.0.0.0/0, as expected for a public load balancer. S3: all three buckets block public access.

Not checked: RDS in ap-northeast-3 was access denied (resultCoverage), so instances there are unknown. The encryption settings of orders-logs-111122223333 and orders-exports-111122223333 could not be read (UnretrievedConfigurations), so they are unknown, not unencrypted.

You: Write Terraform for this VPC and its subnets.

Terminal window
awnexa resources list --type AWS::EC2::VPC --compact
awnexa resources list --parent vpc-0123456789abcdef0 --compact
awnexa resources show vpc-0123456789abcdef0 --full --compact

Claude Code writes the Terraform from the collected properties and notes values it could not see, for example secrets that Awnexa masks.

You: Draft a runbook for this system.

Terminal window
awnexa overview --compact
awnexa report --out ./docs/aws --doc overview,network,security

Claude Code drafts the inventory, dependencies, routine checks and first steps for common failures, and marks the parts that depend on what was not collected.

Understand

  • “Explain this AWS environment and draw an architecture diagram.”
  • “Summarize the VPCs, their subnets and how they connect to the internet.”
  • “What sits behind this load balancer?”
  • “Which resources belong to the orders system (tag app=orders)?”

Change safely

  • “What depends on this security group? What breaks if I delete it?”
  • “Is it safe to delete this subnet?”
  • “Which Lambda functions use this IAM role?”

Investigate

  • “What changed since last week’s scan?”
  • “Show what is connected to the checkout function and what changed in it recently.”

Review

  • “Which resources are publicly reachable or unencrypted?”
  • “Review the security groups that allow traffic from the internet.”
  • “Which services could not be scanned, and why?”

Document and automate

  • “Turn the current network setup into Terraform.”
  • “Draft a runbook for this system.”
  • “Write a design document for this account.”